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NOTES
HAZARDOUS WASTE IN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE: MINIMIZING THE PROBLEM
AFTER CITY OF PHILADELPHIA V. NEW
JERSEY
Will you teach your children what we have taught our children?
That the earth is our mother? What befalls the earth befalls all
the sons of the earth.
This we know: The earth does not belong to man, man belongs
to the earth. All things are connected like the blood that unites
us all. Man did not weave the web of life, he is merely a strand
in it. Whatever he does to the web, he does to himself.
Chief Seattle's letter to President
Franklin Pierce, 1853'
I. INTRODUCTION
Hazardous waste2 disposal is a relatively recent threat to the environ-
mental web. While the problem posed by hazardous waste disposal dates
1. Quoted in J. CAMPBELL & B. MOYERS, THE POWER OF MYTH 32-35 (1988). Chief
Seattle was the chief of the Dwamish, Suquamish, and allied Indian tribes. He befriended the
early white settlers and signed the Treaty of Point Elliott in 1855, which surrendered land to
agency administration. DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 542 (1935).
2. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 defines hazardous waste as:
solid waste, or combination of solid waste, which because of its quantity, concentration,
or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics, may A) cause, or significantly contrib-
ute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating
reversible, illness; or B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or
the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or other-
wise managed.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1982) [hereinafter RCRA].
Cf. W. FREEDMAN, HAZARDOUS WASTE LIABILITY 70 (1987): "[E]ven garbage in this
'throwaway' society can become hazardous waste; everyday products such as plastics,
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from the increase in the use of fossil fuels during the Industrial Revolution, 3
it began to assume monstrous proportions with the rapid growth of the
chemical industry following World War II." At the end of World War II,
the United States produced an estimated one billion pounds of hazardous
waste per year, and this figure has increased yearly by approximately 10
percent.5 By 1985, the United States had produced some 275 million metric
tons (over 600 billion pounds) of hazardous waste.6 For many years disposal
was accomplished thoughtlessly and dangerously, 7 but now a proliferation
of state and federal laws8 governs the classification, transportation, use, and
disposal of hazardous wastes.
At present, the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution9
medicines, paints, oils and gasolines, metals, leather and textiles can generate hazardous
waste." Id. For purposes of this note, however, hazardous waste is defined in accordance with
the above RCRA standard. Cf. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2606(f) (1982)
(defining "imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture"); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A) (1982) (defining hazardous discharges) and 33
U.S.C. § 1317(a) (1982) (defining toxic pollutants); and Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a) (1982) (additional hazardous
substances and reportable released quantities).
3. S. EPSTEIN, L. BROWN & C. POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA 9 (1982) [here-
inafter S. EPSTEIN] (development of coal tar dyes and advancements in metallurgy made sub-
stantial contributions to the volume of dangerous wastes).
4. Id. at 7.
5. Id.
6. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE HAZ-
ARDOUS WASTE SYSTEM 2-2 (June 1987) [hereinafter WASTE SYSTEM] (RCRA hazardous
wastes). But see S. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 7 (80 billion pounds of hazardous waste annu-
ally). Estimating the rate of hazardous waste generation is a notoriously difficult task:
In the initial years of the RCRA program, EPA said that about 40 million metric tons of
hazardous waste were generated annually. Then in the early 1980s, beginning with OTA
[Office of Technology Assistance], the Congressional Budget Office and an EPA contrac-
tor study raised the estimated level to some 250 million metric tons annually. However, a
survey of 1984 practices taken by Chemical Manufacturers Association of its members
suggested that total RCRA waste generation for the Nation might be as high as I billion
tons annually.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, (OTA-ITE-347), FROM POLLUTION
TO PREVENTION 19 (June 1987) [hereinafter FROM POLLUTION]; OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE,
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 1 1985 NATIONAL BIENNIAL REPORT OF HAZ-
ARDOUS WASTE GENERATORS AND TREATMENT, STORAGE AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES Regu-
lated Under RCRA 5 (Mar. 1989) [hereinafter BIENNIAL REPORT] (271 million tons in 1985).
There are an estimated 115,000 generators of hazardous waste in the U.S. W. RODGERS, JR.,
3 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 520 (1988).
7. See infra note 161. See also W. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 72-75 (for a description
of the Love Canal Crisis); S. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 153-78 (midnight dumping still prac-
ticed despite regulations).
8. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
9. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have Power to Regulate Com-
merce . . . among the several States ...." The Commerce Clause seeks to insure free trade
throughout the Union through its "positive" aspect (Congress' plenary power to regulate) and
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has been interpreted to require that hazardous waste be allowed to move
freely across state lines. As the volume of hazardous waste increases and
the availability of safe disposal sites decreases, many states export their
waste problems rather than institute measures to minimize their production
and volume of hazardous waste'0 and to site necessary waste disposal and
processing facilities.1" Such an unrestrained waste export alternative may
run counter to the Nation's need for a unified approach to hazardous waste
production and disposal issues.
While Congress has long considered waste disposal as essentially a
state responsibility, Congress does acknowledge the national implications of
the problem. 2 Rather than preempt 3 the field of hazardous waste disposal
completely, the federal government has delegated authority to the states to
control their own disposal matters when the states demonstrate that their
hazardous waste legislation is as comprehensive and stringent as federal
laws. 4 The federal government has promulgated an ever-tightening series
its "dormant" aspect (the courts' ability to strike down state legislation that conflicts with free
movement of commerce). "It would be difficult to overstate the breadth and depth of the com-
merce power . . . . The Commerce Clause, we have long held, displaces state authority even
where Congress has chosen not to act." Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273
(1989). The Commerce Clause is the "chief source of congressional regulatory power and,
implicitly, a limitation on state legislative power." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
306 (1988). Congress has such broad power under the Commerce Clause that "judicial review
of the affirmative authorization for congressional action is largely a formality." Id. at 316. An
attempt was made to invoke the tenth amendment to trump congressional control of interstate
commerce in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). But in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985), a closely divided Court overruled
Usery and reaffirmed the broad federal powers. See generally Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?
Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Pol-
icy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977) (analyzing the interaction of the states and the federal govern-
ment in environmental regulations in light of Usery).
10. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
I1. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
12. [Wlhile collection and disposal of solid waste should continue to be primarily a
function of state, regional, and local agencies, the problems of waste disposal . . . have
become a matter national in scope and in concern and necessitate Federal action through
financial and technical assistance and leadership in the development, demonstration, and
application of new and improved methods and processes ....
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4).
13. The Supremacy Clause authorizes federal preemption of state action when Congress
has been delegated the power to act in an area and has done so or might have done so, or when
federal legislation has deliberately created a vacuum. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 479. U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (federal
law preempts tanker design); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624
(1973) (no night curfew of jet flights from private airport).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 6226, 40 C.F.R. § 262.21 (1987). There is a trend toward federal dele-
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of rigorous hazardous waste regulations;' however, the interaction between
the states and the federal government in implementing federal environmen-
tal legislation is problematic.' Bowing to the demands of federalism"7 and
recognizing that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 8 has insuffi-
cient resources to oversee the entire hazardous waste disposal program
without state assistance,"9 much federal environmental legislation is imple-
mented through federal supervision of the states in what the EPA calls "en-
vironmental federalism."20 However, federal supervision of state hazardous
gation of responsibility to the states that is expected to continue with regard to various hazard-
ous waste, pollution discharge, drinking water standards, and air quality standards. As of Au-
gust 1988, forty-three states ("states" include the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, U.S. commonwealths and territories) have been delegated authority under the
pre-1984 RCRA program. While the EPA can withdraw this delegated authority (RCRA §
6926(e)), it will only do so in the most extreme circumstances. Under the 1984 Hazardous and
Solid Waste Act of 1984 (HSWA), Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (Nov. 8, 1984) amend-
ments to RCRA, new stricter standards must be met to achieve state delegation, and only
Georgia has met the HSWA standard. Frustration reigns because states view HSWA require-
ments as squeezing out any local controls. Complaints regarding this stricter standard include
the lack of nationally consistent standards, the lack of state authority in implementation, and
the excessive use of state resources to meet federal priorities that may not reflect state needs.
The State/Federal Partnership to Implement RCRA: Is It Working?, INSIDE EPA, Nov. 20,
1987, at 10; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING (GAO/RCED-88-101), PROTECTING HUMAN
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH IMPROVED MANAGEMENT [hereinafter PROTECT-
ING HUMAN HEALTH] 144-48 (Aug. 1988). Ironically, where state law is more rigorous than
federal law, delegation may be withdrawn as it was recently in North Carolina. The EPA
determined that because North Carolina's disposal law was inconsistent with programs in
other states, it interrupted the interstate flow of waste. EPA began RCRA withdrawal pro-
ceedings against North Carolina in 1987 after finding that the state's strict surface water
discharge law impeded the flow of waste across state borders. Greenwood, Not in My Back-
yard, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 33, 35 (1988). See also Snyder, The EPA-North Carolina
Dispute: The Right of States to Pass Stricter Laws Under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 8 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 171 (1988) (arguing that withdrawal of RCRA
authority would violate RCRA). See generally S. GREER, INDIANA'S HAZARDOUS WASTE PRO-
GRAM, PROMISES MADE . . . PROMISES BROKEN (1988) (unhappiness of environmental groups
with hazardous waste primacy in Indiana because of inadequate facilities and staff. Copy on
file at Valparaiso University Law Review office).
15. See infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
17. Federalism is the balance of power between the states and the federal government
and is central to the American system. The judiciary monitors state legislation on behalf of
Congress. Congress may reallocate power, especially under the Commerce, Supremacy, or
Privileges and Immunities clauses. "Without Commerce Clause, Supremacy Clause, and Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause, the Union as we know it would be unthinkable." TRIBE, supra
note 9, at 401.
18. The EPA was created December 2, 1970 by Reorganization No. 3, Pub. L. No. 91-
90, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982)).
19. PROTECTING HUMAN HEALTH, supra note 14, at 144-45.
20. Id. at 144. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) recognizes that the states
seek a more equal partnership with the federal government. States feel that the federal govern-
ment does not trust them. A 1988 GAO report notes that the tension in the relationship re-
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waste programs has often been ineffective, 2' and state non-compliance 22
with federal mandates is widespread.
In 1978, the Supreme Court decided in City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey"2 that state laws banning the importation of waste violate the Com-
merce Clause.2 4 The requirement that wastes be permitted to move freely
as items in interstate commerce25 has meant that hazardous waste often
moves great distances around the country by rail and road to disposal sites
far beyond the generating state.26 This unimpeded movement has created
increasing friction among the states.27
mains unremedied since a similar 1983 GAO study. Id. at 160. See also S. EPSTEIN, supra
note 3, at 176 (The fragmentation of responsibility among agencies and between the states and
the federal government is a critical problem.).
21. The GAO and Office of Inspector General reviews have shown inadequacies in EPA
guidance and in EPA monitoring inspections. In addition, between 1983 and 1987 EPA grants
to states for hazardous waste controls rose only 18 million constant dollars. PROTECTING
HUMAN HEALTH, supra note 19, at 152-57; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO/
RCED-88-20), HAZARDOUS WASTE: FACILITY INSPECTIONS ARE NOT THOROUGH AND COM-
PLETE 46 (November, 1987) (Neither EPA headquarters nor regional offices are overseeing
state compliance effectively and adequately.); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, PROTECTING THE NATION'S GROUNDWATER FROM CONTAMINATION 90-91 (Oct.
1984) [hereinafter PROTECTING] (a survey finding that states perceive the state-federal part-
nership to have problems and see federal help as both inadequate and a hindrance to state
efforts); W. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 3 (Hazardous waste "is an environmental risk of the
greatest magnitude because decisions regarding environmental risk are generally reactive and
not anticipatory."). See generally S. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 221-56, 353-55 (Other imple-
mentation problems involve conflicts of interest and inadequate training of staff and execu-
tives). For a succinct catalog of the administrative problems during Ms. Gorsuch's tenure as
EPA administrator, see W. RODGERS, supra note 6, at 532-33.
22. State compliance with groundwater monitoring, financial responsibility, landfill clo-
sure, and post-closure regulations is very poor. The GAO found that approximately one-half of
all landfills are not in compliance and that the EPA was very far from achieving the targeted
90% compliance. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO/RCED-88-115), HAZARDOUS
WASTE: NEW APPROACH NEEDED TO MANAGE THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOV-
ERY ACT 33-47 (July 1988) [hereinafter NEW APPROACH]. Recently a federal District Court
for the first time permanently closed a hazardous waste landfill for RCRA violations. U.S. v.
Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ind. 1989).
23. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
24. Id. at 629. See infra notes 80-108 and accompanying text.
25. See discussion of City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, infra notes 80-108 and accom-
panying text.
26. In 1985, 3.1 million tons of RCRA hazardous wastes were sent out of state for
disposal. BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 16. The final 1985 BIENNIAL REPORT was re-
leased in Spring, 1989; the statistics were received from the states in order to produce a 1983
report, but the figures were so sketchy and unreliable that the report was never released. In
fact, export figures in the 1985 report are unreliable and "delivered 1985 export amounts were
generally unverifiable." BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 22.
27. For example, South Carolina and North Carolina are currently waging a pitched
battle over each other's hazardous waste. North Carolina banned the disposal of all hazardous
wastes in the state because of failure to site new facilities, and South Carolina retaliated by
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This note suggests that the need for an effective national program to
control hazardous waste production and disposal is so compelling that
schemes must be developed to restrict the interstate movement of hazard-
ous waste and to encourage waste minimization. This note first briefly ex-
amines national environmental policy, 8 the burgeoning federal regulatory
activity in the field of hazardous waste disposal,29 the uneasy partnership
between the states and the federal government, 0 and the lack of federal
leadership in waste minimization. 3' This note then explores the Supreme
Court's decision in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey with regard to the
Court's Commerce Clause analysis.32 The next section outlines the few
means of circumventing the Commerce Clause problem of waste importa-
tion that have been successful.2 3 The note then suggests that the judicial
doctrine mandating the free interstate flow of hazardous waste is frustrat-
ing national policies of hazardous waste transportation safety as well as
state initiatives in waste disposal planning and waste minimization. 3
Finally, this note examines possible judicial35 and legislative 36 options
to restrict hazardous waste migration. The Supreme Court has demon-
strated a growing awareness of the hazardous waste threat and should give
more weight to state environmental concerns arising in the context of Com-
merce Clause challenges. 37 In addition, this note suggests that the federal
government should be willing to exercise its Commerce Clause power to
promote the formation of interstate hazardous waste compacts.3 8 Congress
should also allow those states that do not choose to join a compact, but have
instituted stringent hazardous waste minimization requirements, to prohibit
banning all hazardous waste imports that the exporting state would itself prohibit. Recently,
North Carolina repealed its ban on hazardous waste disposal and is engaged in considering a
regional approach much like the compact system suggested infra notes 205-19. North Caro-
lina: Legislature Passes Waste Management Act, 20 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 208 (June 2, 1989);
North Carolina, 19 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 2378 (Mar. 10, 1989). In an effort to stem the west-
ward flow of all wastes, Ohio is urging Congress to institute measures to put the brakes on,
including a $40 per ton state tax on imported garbage. Bukro, Ohio Fighting Garbage Ruling
That Leaves it Holding the Bag, Chicago Tribune, July 9, 1989, at 21.
28. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
31. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 80-108 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 111-45 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 151-86 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 187-219 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
38. Compacts are congressionally approved bi-state or multi-state organizations designed
to make a unified attack on a common problem. See infra notes 205-18 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 24
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the importation of wastes not subject to similar strict requirements. 9 Such
legislation would restrict the movement of hazardous wastes across state
borders, thereby forcing states to take responsibility for their own wastes, to
pursue waste minimization seriously, and to work together in compacts to
achieve national environmental goals.
II. PROLIFERATION OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND THE STRUGGLE TO
FIND NATIONAL UNIFORMITY IN ADDRESSING HAZARDOUS WASTE ISSUES
A major shift in American legislative orientation toward environmental
concerns began in 1969 with the enactment of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA).4 ° NEPA reflected the growing awareness of the Amer-
ican people and their leaders regarding potential and actual threats to the
environment. The Act mandated a broad examination of many federal
projects, taking into account the project's environmental impact and requir-
ing that these considerations be formalized in an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS). " ' NEPA set the tone for the fledgling EPA and for the
great quantity of environmental legislation to follow.
Within the two decades since the enactment of the NEPA,42 the
39. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
40. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 [hereinafter NEPA] Pub. L. No. 91-
190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370 (1982 to 1986 Supp.
IV)).
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy which will encourage pro-
ductive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate
the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and
natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental
Quality.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 4332:
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall
(c) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action.
42. NEPA, supra note 40. Agencies shall "utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary ap-
proach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environ-
mental design arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on the
human environment." 40 C.F.R. § 1507.2(a) (1986). Regulation of the environment is clearly
a necessity. The market cannot control pollution:
[Miuch of the harm done by a polluter falls upon others. In his rational self-interest, the
polluter may be willing to destroy an entire county to make an extra dime. He would not
do so if the victim offered him twenty cents to stop, but in the real world the victim
cannot always make the offer. In the typical pollution case, the harm is suffered not by
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United States Congress has begun to address the problem of groundwater
contamination, the principal environmental threat posed by the disposal of
hazardous wastes. Groundwater43 is the source of drinking water for ap-
proximately one-half of the nation's population," and all states have re-
ported contamination of some private and public water supplies. 5 Despite
the enactment of much federal environmental legislation during the past
decade, no uniform groundwater legislation has appeared .4  A number of
one but by thousands.
Currie, State Pollution Statutes, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 27, 28 (1981).
43. Groundwater is "water that occurs in saturated, non-consolidated geologic material
(sand or gravel) and is in fractured or porous rock." R. PATRICK, E. FORD & J. QUARLES,
GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2d Ed. 1987) [hereinafter R.
PATRICK]. Contamination occurs when rainwater mixes with hazardous substances and the
resulting mixture, called leachate, migrates out of the land disposal site. Id.
44. PROTECTING, supra note 21, at 5.
45. S. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 69-151 (regarding groundwater contamination). See
also R. PATRICK, supra note 43, at 46 (percentage of groundwater use is as low as 2% in
Montana and as high as 85% in Iowa). While no comprehensive national drinking water sur-
vey has been made, contamination has been reported in every state. The most common pollu-
tants are heavy metals, organics, microorganisms, and nitrates. Id. at 7; Gordon, Legal Incen-
tives for Reduction Reuse and Recycling. A New Approach to Hazardous Waste
Management, 95 YALE L.J. 810, 811 n.5 (1986) (unreleased EPA study showing 29% of the
underground drinking water in 954 cities is contaminated). Adding to the regulation problem
is the fact that we have no information regarding the health effects of 70% of the 60,000-
70,000 chemicals to which we are exposed. CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE ENVI-
RONMENT: AN ASSESSMENT AT MID-DECADE 65 (1984) (quoting a National Academy of Sci-
ences report).
46. R. PATRICK, supra note 43, at 12. Groundwater issues are addressed by several
Acts: Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (includes procedures for the registration, classification, sale, use,
monitoring, and disposal of pesticides); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2654 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (regulates the manufacture, use, and disposal of chem-
icals that pose a significant risk of injury to the environment and human health); Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986) (protects the environment from the adverse effects of surface mining); Clean
Water Act of 1977 (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (controls pollu-
tant discharge into navigable waters); Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-
300j-l 1 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (protects drinking water supplies, establishes MCLs (maxi-
mum contaminant levels), and regulates deep well injection); Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (regulates
disposal of hazardous wastes); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Li-
ability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (federal
government's response to the release or threatened release of hazardous substances). See also
Lutz, Interstate Environmental Law: Federalism Bordering on Neglect?, 13 Sw. U.L. REV.
571, 594-601 (1983) (discussing federal statutes in light of interstate groundwater pollution
problems); PROTECTING, supra note 21, at 81 ("The multiplicity of both groundwater-related
laws and the agencies responsible for their implementation has fragmented federal protection
of groundwater quality."); and PROTECTING, supra note 21, at 6:
Despite growing Federal and State efforts, programs are still limited in their ability to
protect against [environmental] contamination. For example, there is no explicit national
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acts bear directly on the threat that hazardous waste poses to groundwater
supplies. The Clean Water Act of 197247 was the first legislation to address
the problem of hazardous waste handling directly. The Hazardous Materi-
als Transportation Act of 197548 followed The Clean Water Act and ad-
dressed the need to protect against accidents involving vehicles moving
health-and environment-threatening substances.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976"1 (RCRA) and
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 198050 (CERCLA), as amended,5 1 mark the government's most con-
certed efforts to date to address past and future threats posed by the dispo-
sal of hazardous wastes. RCRA calls for the recycling and reduction52 of
wastes whenever possible and has progressively tightened controls on land-
fill operation 53 as well as the landfill disposal and deep well injection of
certain types of hazardous wastes.5 4 RCRA also mandates the phasing out
legislative mandate to protect groundwater quality; and although the groundwater protec-
tion strategy of the United States Environmental Protection Agency acknowledges the
need for comprehensive resource management, the details of the strategy do not fully
provide for it.
Id. at 6.
47. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
48. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1813 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Dep't of Transp. Reg. 45 U.S.C.
§§ 421-444; 46 U.S.C. §§ 170-170b.
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The 1984 RCRA amendments,
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments Act of 1984 (HSWA) Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat.
3221 (Nov. 8, 1984), (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6901, § 6991), were Congress' reaction to EPA's
administrative lapses. W. RODGERS, supra note 6, at 513.
50. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
51. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L.
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601; 26 U.S.C. § 4611; 42
U.S.C. § 11001); The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA), Pub. L.
No. 98-616, § 224(c), 98 Stat. 322 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6982(r)).
52. (a)The objectives . . . are to promote the protection of health and the environ-
ment and to conserve valuable material and energy resources by...
(6) minimizing the generation of hazardous waste and the land disposal of haz-
ardous waste by encouraging process substitution, material recovery, properly conducted
recycling and reuse, and treatment; . . .
(b) The Congress hereby declares it to be the national policy of the United States
that, wherever feasible, the generation of hazardous waste is to be reduced or eliminated
as expeditiously as possible.
RCRA 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(6), (b). But see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CON-
GRESS (OTA-ITE-317), SERIOUS REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS 157 (Sept. 1986) [hereinafter
SERIOUS REDUCTION]. OTA criticizes EPA's implementation of this statute because "[tihe
clear statement giving priority to waste reduction that was provided by the RCRA national
policy statement . . . is not repeated in the regulations [promulgated by EPA]." Id.
53. RCRA 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (strict recordkeeping, monitoring, siting and design
regulations).
54. Id. at § 6924(c)-(g) (minimizes land disposal of liquids and prohibits the disposal of
many hazardous wastes in both landfills and deep wells).
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of landfilling generally"' and instituted a cradle-to-grave manifest system56
to track the movements of hazardous waste.
CERCLA, more commonly known as Superfund, attacks the problem
of leaking landfills and helps states finance the identification and cleanup of
dangerous sites. 7  Most recently, the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) included § 104(c)(9), 58 mandating
that the states receiving federal money for the cleanup of dangerous haz-
ardous waste sites take inventory of their hazardous waste production and
disposal facilities. States must give assurances to the federal government by
October, 1989, that they have the capacity, through their own disposal fa-
cilities and through agreements with other states, to accommodate pro-
jected hazardous waste production for a twenty-year period. Failure to pro-
vide such assurances will result in the federal government withdrawing
remedial assistance to the state. The EPA instituted this provision in recog-
nition that some states are not accepting the responsibility for their own
hazardous waste production.5" Rather, some states are exporting hazardous
55. [Ciertain classes of land disposal facilities are not capable of assuring longterm
containment of certain hazardous waste, and to avoid substantial risk to human health
and the environment, reliance on land disposal should be minimized or eliminated, and
land disposal, particularly landfill and surface impoundment, should be the least favored
method of managing hazardous waste.
Id. at § 6901(b)(7).
56. Id. at 42 U.S.C. § 6922 ("Cradle-to-grave" refers to a recordkeeping system that
follows the progress of the waste from its generation site to its ultimate disposal site.).
57. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
58. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) [CERCLA § 104(c)(9)], Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (1986):
(9) Siting
Effective 3 years after October 17, 1986, the President shall not provide any remedial
actions pursuant to this section unless the State in which the release occurs first enters
into a contract or cooperative agreement with the President providing assurances deemed
adequate by the President that the State will assure the availability of hazardous waste
treatment or disposal facilities which-
(A) have adequate capacity for the destruction, treatment, or secure disposition of
all hazardous wastes that are reasonably expected to be generated within the State dur-
ing the 20-year period following the date of such contract or cooperative agreement and
to be disposed of, treated, or destroyed,
(B) are within the State or outside the State in accordance with an interstate agree-
ment or regional agreement or authority,
(C) are acceptable to the President, and
(D) are in compliance with the requirements of subtitle C of the Solid Waste Dispo-
sal Act.
Id.
59. The legislative purpose behind CERCLA § 104(c)(9) is clear:
Superfund money should not be spent in states that are taking insufficient steps to avoid
the creation of future Superfund sites. The Congress recognized that a safe and rational
hazardous waste management program for the nation depended in part on the creation of
new facilities. . . .While many States enacted or planned to enact siting legislation, . ..
[Vol. 24
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waste instead of facing tough political decisions regarding industrial waste
reduction and minimization60 and disposal facility siting.6"
The Capacity Assurance Program (CAP) has caused a considerable
measure of discomfort to state governors in the major hazardous waste im-
porting states.62 They fear that some exporting states may be content to
few, if any, were developing policies and siting programs that would assure continued
facility capacity in the long term.
53 Fed. Reg. 33,619 (1988). See also supra note 27.
60. SERIOUS REDUCTION, supra note 52, at 8-10. Waste reduction is defined by the Of-
fice of Technology Assessment (OTA) as "in-plant practices that reduce, avoid, or eliminate
the generation of hazardous waste so as to reduce risks to health and environment." Id. Waste
minimization, the term used in this note, is broader and encompasses the type of waste man-
agement that reduces the amount of waste to be land disposed through reclamation and re-
cycling. For a comprehensive proposal for a national waste reduction policy stimulated by the
OTA and the responsive EPA reports, see Blomquist, Beyond the EPA and OTA Reports:
Toward a Comprehensive Theory and Approach to Hazardous Waste Reduction in America,
18 ENVTL. L. 817 (1988). See also Gordon, supra note 45 (proposing model federal reduction
and recycling legislation).
61. See generally M. GREENBERG & R. ANDERSON, HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES: THE
CREDIBILITY GAP (1984) (detailing the scope of the abandoned waste site problem and the
problem involved in siting new landfills); infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. In fact, all
states export some portion of the wastes they generate. The top five exporting states are Mas-
sachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 6, at
111-16.
62. Louisiana, Michigan, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania accounted for 49.5% of
hazardous waste imports in 1985. BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 111-16.
The National Governors' Association (NGA) has taken an active role in creating the
guidelines for states to comply with the requirements of CERCLA § 104(c)(9). The combined
NGA recommendations and EPA reactions were published in Draft State Hazardous Waste
Capacity Assurance Guidance, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,618 (1988) [Draft Guidance]. The final ver-
sion of the guidelines appeared in December 1988 after going through a rocky rulemaking
process. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ASSURANCE
OF HAZARDOUS WASTE CAPACITY (Dec. 1988) [hereinafter ASSURANCE]. The assurances from
the states were due at EPA by October 17, 1989; the guidelines went through many drafts and
the final version was approved in December 1988. The major sticking point was the fear of
Commerce Clause problems attendant on interstate agreements that would put controls on
waste flow. Telephone conversation with Mike Burns, Senior Program Analyst, Information
Management Staff, Office of Solid Waste, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington,
D.C. (Dec. 7, 1988).
The NGA had proposed that the federal government referee disputes between states and
help to determine what constitutes "reasonable" exports. Draft Guidance, at 33,619. The final
guidelines, however, indicate that the federal government will provide no such service. In fact,
the final document merely alludes to potential conflicts:
States may choose to enter into agreements to assure access to facilities in bilateral or
multi-lateral documents signed between or among states. Clearly, such agreements will
reflect substantial dialogue regarding actual and projected waste flows. Further, discus-
sions among states are likely to raise distributional and equity concerns .... EPA antici-
pates that this agreement would be signed every two years, as the state updates its data
and planning documents.
ASSURANCE, supra note 62, at 8-9.
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forego Superfund money rather than enter interstate disposal agreements
and make tough siting decisions in their own states.6 3 Environmentally re-
sponsible states with abundant landfill space fear that they will find their
facilities rapidly filling with less prudently handled wastes from other
states."' In addition, long-term state capacity planning for the most respon-
sible importing states would become impossible.
6 5
Strict federal guidelines and the growing NIMBY (not-in-my-back-
yard) Syndrome6 6 complicate hazardous waste disposal facility siting for
many states. Because of Americans' growing awareness of hazardous waste
dangers, they are increasingly distrustful of official assurances of site
safety, 7 and indeed such assurances may be misleading ." Hazardous waste
Many states responded to the final guidelines with outrage. Dennis Muchnicki, Chief of
Environmental Enforcement for the Ohio Attorney General's Office, predicts "suits and civil
warfare between states" because the federal government has "defaulted on its obligation" to
provide a method to resolve disputes. Hazardous Waste: State Officials Blast EPA Capacity
Guidance, Predict Suits, 'Civil War' Over Hazardous Waste, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1899
(Jan. 27, 1989).
63. Telephone conversation with Jim Frank, Illinois Superfund, Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency (Oct. 28, 1988). Under the new Superfund amendments, states must agree
to assure future maintenance of the remedial actions, assure availability of a site to share
removed materials, and pay 10% of the remedial costs of a non-state-owned facility. CER-
CLA § 9604(c)(3). Presumably, states without acceptable capacity assurances will have to
shoulder the entire financial burden of site cleanup.
64. For example, in 1983 Illinois imported as much hazardous waste as it exported, but
now imports far exceed exports. At this importation rate, Illinois can probably only assure
disposal of its own waste for some six years despite abundant facilities. Telephone conversation
with Jim Frank, supra note 63. See also Florini, Issues of Federalism in Hazardous Waste
Control: Cooperation or Confusion?, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 307 (1982) (noting the "re-
verse commons problem in hazardous waste disposal").
65. Telephone conversation with Jim Frank, supra note 63.
66. A number of commentators have suggested schemes to facilitate siting against public
opposition: Bacon & Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities:
The Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 265 (1982) (encourages community
compensation rather than state preemption of the siting process); Davis, Approaches to the
Regulation of Hazardous Waste, 18 ENVTL. L. 505, 517-18 (1988) (advocates intensive public
education regarding siting); Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts: The Role of the Federal
Courts, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 263 (1982) (suggests federal-site selection boards);
Tarlock, Anywhere But Here: An Introduction to State Control of Hazardous Waste Facility
Location, 2 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (1981) (Statewide bodies must be able to
preempt local land use regulations.).
67. See, e.g., INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, I ENVIRON-
MENTAL REGULATION IN INDIANA 11-5 (May 1988) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL REGULA-
TION]. The state recognizes the need to overcome public mistrust of public officials' assurances
and stresses the need for education.
68. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO/RCED-88-29), HAZARDOUS WASTE:
GROUNDWATER CONDITIONS AT MANY LAND DISPOSAL FACILITIES REMAIN UNCERTAIN 8
(Feb. 1988). (Landfill and construction monitoring regulations can only minimize the pollution
threat.). It is commonly believed that state-of-the-art landfill technology is absolutely fool-
proof, but
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landfill space is dwindling rapidly across the country; in 1984 there were
1,500 facilities, and in June 1987 there were only 500.69 CAP seeks to
lessen this siting burden by requiring that the reporting states demonstrate
state legislation that would facilitate siting.70 Such changes in state legisla-
tion could prove to be unpopular with many vigilant environmentalists and
legislators who are anxious to get rid of the problem, and such conflicts
would again make the option of waste export an attractive alternative for
state governments.
Similarly, waste minimization 7 1 is a technique that the federal govern-
ment has strongly recommended, but has failed to require that states
adopt. 2 Although RCRA has made it clear that waste minimization is the
way of the future 7 3 the federal government has left the initiation of mini-
mization policies to the individual states because of the complexity of mak-
ing nationwide standards apply to all hazardous waste industries and be-
cause of the perception that the states are better situated to address the
problem.7 4 The federal government also has devoted a very small percent-
age of its budget to waste minimization, 75 but has promised to provide tech-
nical and educational support to the states. 76
A [landfill] liner is a barrier technology that prevents or greatly restricts migration of
liquids into the ground. No liner, however, can keep all liquids out of the ground for all
time. Eventually liners will either degrade, tear, or crack and will allow liquids to migrate
out of the unit. . . . Some have argued that liners are devices that provide a perpetual
seal against migration. . . . EPA has concluded that the more reasonable assumption
• * ' is that any liner will begin to leak eventually.
47 Fed. Reg. 32,284-85 (1982).
69. WASTE SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 3-1.
70. ASSURANCE, supra note 62, at 67-78.
71. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
72. SERIOUS REDUCTION, supra note 52 (OTA quotes many examples of EPA calling
for aggressive waste minimization but making little real commitment.). While many would like
to believe that the clear trend is away from disposal and toward waste minimization, the
HSWA amendments continue to show a clear disposal bias. W. RODGERS, supra note 6, at
522. Currently there are bills in both houses of Congress to increase funding for waste reduc-
tion. The bills have some industry support because reduction would be strictly voluntary. Haz-
ardous Waste: Waste Reduction Bill With 234 Backers Stalls During House Subcommittee
Makeup, 19 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 175-76 (June 3, 1988).
73. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
74. SERIOUS REDUCTION, supra note 60, at 29-37. But see Blomquist, supra note 60, at
821 (arguing that Congress must consider "first principles" in formulating a comprehensive
national waste reduction theory and that "a responsible, prescriptive, federal approach to haz-
ardous waste reduction should be coordinated with the non-regulatory approach proposed by
the EPA and OTA reports").
75. FROM POLLUTION, supra note 6, at 37 (In fiscal year 1988, the minimization budget
was .03% of the total EPA budget.).
76. Under RCRA § 6902(a)(1) the federal government will
[provide] technical and financial assistance to state and local governments and interstate
agencies for the development of solid waste management plans-including resource re-
covery and resource conservation systems-which will promote improved solid waste
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Again, this lack of a firm federal initiative has created another set of
hard political choices for states that are reluctant to discourage industry
from locating within their borders. The option of exporting hazardous
waste, rather than requiring and policing serious waste minimization or im-
plementing tax incentives, has given states a convenient way to avoid the
minimization issue. The proposed guidelines for the capacity assurance pro-
gram require states to report their minimization efforts, if any, in the com-
putation of hazardous waste production,77 but do not propose any required
guidelines for minimization levels.
While the volume of legislative enactments is impressive in its scope,
the federal-state partnership in implementation of federal minimum stan-
dards has been less than uniformly effective. Reports of the states' failure to
comply with minimum standards are legion, 78 and such failure is largely
due to lapses in federal supervision and unwillingness to apply tough sanc-
tions for non-compliance.79 The Capacity Assurance Program is the first
federal law to recognize that the voluminous federal hazardous waste legis-
lation has the effect of encouraging states to export their waste rather than
prepare for the future. However, any serious efforts to slow interstate com-
merce in hazardous waste may run headlong into the teaching of the Su-
preme Court in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.
management techniques . . . new and improved methods of collection, separation, and
recovery of solid waste, and the environmentally safe disposal of nonrecoverable
residues....
Id.
The federal government will "[provide] training grants in occupations involving the design,
operation and maintenance of solid waste disposal systems;" RCRA § 6902(a)(2); and the
federal government will "[establish] a cooperative effort among the federal, state and local
governments and private enterprise in order to recover valuable materials and energy from
solid waste." RCRA § 6902(11).
77. ASSURANCE, supra note 62, at 39-53.
78. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
79. See NEw APPROACH, supra note 22, at 43-44:
[iln June 1988 we [GAO] reported that EPA and the states had met EPA's criteria for
taking timely and appropriate enforcement actions in only 37 percent of the over 800
enforcement cases we reviewed. For example, in some cases penalties, although called for
by EPA criteria, had not been assessed. In that report we concluded that until EPA's
enforcement performance is improved, no assurance exists that threatening environmental
conditions are being dealt with in a timely, consistent and equitable manner and that the
deterrent effect of enforcement actions could be weakened. . . . After observing 26 in-
spections around the country, we reported in November 1987 that inspectors missed al-
most as many violations as they found[.]
Id.
[Vol. 24
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III. City of Philadephia v. New Jersey: WASTES IN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE
In the early 1970s, New Jersey began to recognize that incoming waste
was adding to its great disposal problem. In response, New Jersey enacted a
law in 197380 that prohibited the importation of out-of-state solid or liquid
wastes intended for disposal in New Jersey's dwindling landfill space.8 1
New Jersey enacted this ban after finding that its landfill space was se-
verely limited and that its environment and public health and safety would
be best served by limiting the volume of waste disposal in the state.82 New
Jersey landfill operators, and cities in states that relied on New Jersey land-
fills, sued the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, alleg-
ing that the law violated the Commerce Clause.83 The New Jersey Supreme
Court upheld the law as a proper exercise of state police powers. 4 The
decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
80. Waste Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-10 (West Supp. 1978).
81. "No person shall bring into this state any solid or liquid waste which originated or
was collected outside the territorial limits of the State .. " Id.
82. The Legislature finds and determines that . . . The volume of solid and liquid
waste continues to rapidly increase, that the treatment and disposal of these wastes con-
tinues to pose an even greater threat to the quality of the environment of New Jersey,
that the available and appropriate land fill sites within the State are being diminished,
that the environment continues to be threatened by the treatment and disposal of waste
which originated or was collected outside the State, and that the public health, safety and
welfare require that the treatment and disposal within the state of all wastes generated
outside of the State be prohibited.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-9 (West 1979). See also Cain, Routes and Roadblocks: State Con-
trols on Hazardous Waste Imports, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 767, 768 (1983) (advocating waste
import restrictions to reduce public opposition to facility siting, to give benefit to the risk-
bearers, and to reduce illegal disposal); Note, Waste Embargoes Held a Violation of Com-
merce Clause: Philadelphia v. New Jersey, II CONN. L. REV. 292 (1979) (quoting from Ap-
pellee's brief and affidavit regarding landfill space and health dangers).
83. The trial court agreed, granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The New
Jersey Supreme Court agreed, consolidating this action with Hackensack Meadowlands Devel-
opment Commission v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Authority, 127 N.J. Super. 160, 316 A.2d
711 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974). The New Jersey Supreme Court found that federal law
did not preempt the New Jersey statute and that the state's great interest in health and safety,
compared to the small burden on interstate commerce, made the law acceptable. Hackensack
Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Philadelphia, 68 N.J. 451, 348 A.2d 505 (1975). The dispute
reached the United States Supreme Court and was remanded to the state on the question of
preemption by the newly-enacted Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-87 (1976). The New Jersey Supreme Court again found no federal preemption. City
of Philadelphia v. State Dep't. of Envtl. Protection, 73 N.J. 562, 376 A.2d 888 (1977).
84. Hackensack, 68 N.J. at 472, 348 A.2d at 516. The police powers of the states were
first recognized in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (The Gibbons court defines
police powers as "that immense mass of legislation, which embraces everything within the
territory of the state, not surrendered to the general government."). Id. at 89. See also Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960) (Police powers may be
exercised to protect public health.).
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After finding that the recently enacted RCRA did not preempt the
disposal issue,8" the Court turned to the Commerce Clause issue and struck
down New Jersey's exclusion law as a clear violation of interstate com-
merce."6 The New Jersey Supreme Court had relied on earlier cases87 in
concluding that wastes are not articles in commerce, but the United States
Supreme Court determined that "[a]ll objects of interstate trade merit
Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded by definition at the out-
set.""8 The Court interpreted earlier decisions to apply only to articles
whose movement created a very high risk.88
Having conferred on wastes the legal status of articles in commerce,
the Court reiterated the fundamental purpose of the Commerce Clause to
prevent economic isolation 0 and protectionism8 ' while respecting the states'
police powers to safeguard health and safety.8 2 Noting the two prongs of
Commerce Clause analysis, that is, the per se rule of invalidity in cases of
economic protectionism 8 and the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.9 4 balancing
85. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 620 (1978).
86. Id. at 629.
87. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 525 (1935) (upholds quarantine exception
to the Commerce Clause); Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 489
(1887) (Waste that is not merchantable and is worthless is not in commerce.). But see the
current approach in Illinois v. General Electric Co., 683 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1982) (Waste
is commerce even if "traffic is in 'bads' rather than goods.").
88. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623.
89. The court cited Bowman's definition of noxious articles "which, on account of their
existing condition, would bring in and spread disease, pestilence, and death." Philadelphia,
437 U.S. at 623 (quoting Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 489
(1887)).
90. See Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 523 (Cardozo's famous remark regarding isolationism was
that "people of the several states must sink or swim together.").
91. See, e.g., Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (The court
found the purported health measure to be a guise for protectionism.).
92. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978).
93. H.P. Hood and Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (striking down New
York law meant to protect the local milk industry); Foster-Fountain, 278 U.S. at 13 (striking
down Louisiana statute designed to bring shrimp canning industry into Louisiana).
94. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of
the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities. [emphasis supplied].
Id. at 142.
The balancing test does not sit well with some members of the Court. See Bendix Autolite
Corp. v. Midwestco Enterprises, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 2218, 2223 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("[The Pike balancing] is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particu-
lar rock is heavy."); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (Scalia, J., concur-
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test where discrimination is not patent and where legitimate state interests
are advanced, the Court asserted that protectionism can be found in both
legislative means and ends. 9" The Court never reached the balancing test
because it found per se discrimination and determined that New Jersey's
primary purpose was to gain economic advantage at the expense of inter-
state commerce.
The Court further held that New Jersey's ban on incoming solid waste
was protectionist, discriminated against out-of-state waste solely on the ba-
sis of its origin," and impermissibly put the entire burden of preserving
landfill space on out-of-state dumpers while not restricting New Jersey resi-
dents' use of landfill space. 97 In so holding, the Court deemed landfill space
to constitute a natural resource" that could not be reserved to the exclusive
use of state residents. 99 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, did say
that New Jersey could achieve its end by slowing the flow of all waste into
its landfills.'00
The Court took a very restricted view of New Jersey's analogy to state
quarantine laws, which are upheld despite their burden on interstate com-
merce.1"1 Finally, the Court noted that New Jersey might one day wish to
export its own waste and would be inconvenienced if neighboring states
closed their borders to imported wastes. 10 2
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, wrote a strong dis-
sent, finding the quarantine law analogy dispositive' 03 and stressing the
dangers of landfill leachate, 0° methane explosions (from decaying organic
waste material), rodents, fires, and scavengers.10 5 The dissenters noted that
New Jersey could not eliminate the need to dispose of its own waste.'06 In
ring) ("[S]uch an inquiry is ill-suited to the judicial function and should be undertaken rarely
if at all.").
95. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978).
96. Id. at 629. The Court said there was no reason, apart from the origin of the waste,
to ban it.
97. Id. at 627. But see Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE
L.J. 425, 463 (1982) (In fact, less than 100% of the burden fell on out-of-state producers in
Philadelphia, and under Eule's scheme, the burden on New Jersey landfill operators would be
taken into account in Commerce Clause analysis.).
98. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626. See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
99. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628.
100. Id. at 627. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 89. See also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521
(1935) (minimum milk pricing not without the quarantine exception); Asbell v. Kansas, 209
U.S. 251, 256 (1908) (state may regulate importation of unhealthy animals or decayed foods).
102. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629.
103. Id. at 631-32.
104. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
105. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 630.
106. Id. at 632. "The physical fact of life that New Jersey must somehow dispose of its
1989]
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addition, the dissent rejected the majority's notion that the quarantine laws
concerned movement rather than disposal: "Solid waste which is a health
hazard when it reaches its destination may in all likelihood be an equally
great health hazard in transit."1 0 7 Finally, Rehnquist asserted his conten-
tion that New Jersey should be allowed to avoid the aggravation of its
waste disposal problems and the threat to public health and safety posed by
accepting others' wastes. 10 8
In the years since Philadelphia, many states have made various at-
tempts to restrict incoming waste.' 9 Options are limited, however, and both
hazardous and non-hazardous waste continues to flow freely among the
states." o
own noxious items does not mean that it must serve as a depository for those of every other
state." Id.
107. Id. See infra note 146.
108. Philadelphia, 637 U.S. at 633. Following Philadelphia, New Jersey's waste dispo-
sal problems have continued because of the very poor geography for the siting of landfills. The
northern third of the state has hard rock formations; the southern two-thirds are comprised
mainly of sandy porous materials and transmit pollutants to the aquifers very readily. Morris,
Hazardous Waste in New Jersey: An Overview, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 623, 625 (1986). As of
1986, 97 New Jersey sites had been identified for federal Superfund cleanup, while the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection has listed 1,200 sites. Id. at 629. The Phila-
delphia Court proved to be prophetic about New Jersey's future export needs as the volume of
hazardous waste exports from New Jersey ranks that state among the top five. BIENNIAL RE-
PORT, supra note 6, at 16. In fact, New Jersey now has in place some of the strictest environ-
mental laws of any state in the Union. For example, the Environmental Cleanup Responsibility
Act (ECRA), N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-6 - 13:1K-14 (1983) requires all owners and opera-
tors of industrial establishments to clean up any environmental contamination before convey-
ing an industrial property. See generally Wagner, Liability for Hazardous Waste Cleanup: An
Examination of New Jersey's Approach, 13 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 245 (1989) (elaborating
on New Jersey's regulations).
109. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147:28-a (repealed 1971, 272:3, eff. Aug. 22,
1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 2764 (West 1973) (repealed by Laws 1981 C.322 § 17, eff.
July, 1981). See also Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 518 F.
Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1981), aff'd, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913
(1983) (striking down public initiative banning import of radioactive wastes). Oregon has
enunciated a "priority" in acceptance of out-of-state hazardous wastes that may, in practice,
violate the Commerce Clause:
[Tihe Legislative Assembly declares that it is the purpose of [these sections] to:
[l]imit to the extent possible the treatment or disposal of hazardous waste and PCB
in Oregon to materials originating in the states that are parties to the Northwest Inter-
state Compact on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 466.010(c) (Supp. 1988).
110. See infra notes 112-38 and accompanying text.
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IV. COPING WITH Philadephia
Since the 1978 Philadelphia decision, states have struggled with the
problems created by the uncontrolled interstate flow of wastes."' While in-
coming waste constitutes an enormous hardship for the traditional "gar-
bage" dump, " 2 the environmental dangers of hazardous waste disposal are
considerably more threatening" ' and require a careful nationwide assess-
ment. State and federal courts have recognized several limited approaches
to discouraging waste importation, including economic disincentives," 4
emergency exceptions," 5 and the market participant exception."" The most
significant scheme is the market participant exception to the Commerce
11l. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
112. W. FREEDMAN, supra note 2 and accompanying text. The interstate movement of
"sanitary" waste (municipal garbage) is causing much friction in all parts of the country and
is a special problem in areas like Northwest Indiana that are near a large out-of-state urban
center. See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
Desperate about the steady flow of garbage into Ohio, that state has approached Congress
asking for federal controls including a $40 per ton state tax on garbage imports. In 1988, Ohio
received 2.4 million tons of imports, double the 1987 figure. Chicago Tribune, July 9, 1989, at
21, col. I.
113. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. See also RCRA § 6901(b)(5): "[T]he
placement of inadequate controls on hazardous waste management will result in substantial
risks to human health and the environment[.]" Id.
114. See infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
116. The market participant exception is invoked when the state is seen to be participat-
ing in the market rather than merely regulating it. See White v. Massachusetts Council of
Constr. Employers, 469 U.S. 240 (1983) (upholding executive order favoring hiring of 50%
instate residents for state-funded projects); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (up-
holding preference for state residents to purchase cement from state-owned facility); Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (upholding Maryland bounty program for aban-
doned Maryland car hulks); "Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause pro-
hibits a state, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and
exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others." Id. at 805. The language in Reeves is
particularly apt: To deny the exception "would interfere significantly with a [s]tate's ability to
structure relations with its own citizens. It would also threaten the future fashioning of effec-
tive and creative programs for solving local problems .. " Reeves, 447 U.S. at 441. See also
Campbell, State Ownership of Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites: A Technique for Excluding
Out of State Wastes?, 14 ENVTL. L. 177 (1983) (warning of dangers if every state were to bar
wastes). Others object to this exception. See, e.g., South-Central Timber Dev. Inc. v. Wun-
nicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Rehnquist is troubled by the majority's
assertion that the distinction between market participant and regulator is a matter of intui-
tion.). See also Note, The Commerce Clause and Federalism: Implications for State Control
of Natural Resources, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 601, 616 (1982) (objecting to the exception as
an unwarranted sidestepping of the Commerce Clause); Note, Recycling Philadelphia v. New
Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Postindustrial "Natural" Resources, and the Solid
Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (1989) (referring to the market participant exception
as a "questionably drawn constitutional doctrine" and a threat to the national interest unless
strictly circumscribed).
Brietzke: Hazardous Waste in Interstate Commerce:  Minimizing the Problem A
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
96 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24
Clause, which pre-dates the Philadelphia decision.
Under the market participant exception, a state or local government
entity that owns or operates a landfill and participates in the waste disposal
market rather than merely regulating that market may be able to exclude
out-of-state waste from its facility on the theory that a state may operate in
the free market and favor its own citizens. 11 7 Just as an out-of-state person
may not freely take advantage of another state's education system, so, too,
may an out-of-state dumper be restricted in his use of a state-operated dis-
posal facility.
While the Philadelphia Court mentioned the market participant the-
ory of waste exclusion in dicta, 118 the Court in Reeves, Inc. v. State'1 9 sub-
sequently suggested in dicta that a state could not hoard natural resources
under the market participant theory. 20 In recent years this limitation on
the market participant theory has been eroding, and in 1987 the District
Court in Le Francois v. State of Rhode Island,2 ' ruled that Rhode Island's
statute excluding out-of-state waste from its Central Landfill 22 did not vio-
late the Commerce Clause because the State was a participant in the land-
fill services market. 22 The court stated that ownership of the resources, the
landfill sites themselves, was not restricted to state residents, but the state
117. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436-37. See also LeFrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F.
Supp. 1204, 1212 (D.R.I. 1987):
While Rhode Island admittedly holds a monopoly in landfill services, I can see no distinc-
tion between this monopoly and the monopoly the State and its municipalities hold in
educational services, or in police and fire protection. Certainly, Rhode Island is not ex-
pected to extend these services to out-of-state residents; the same is true of landfill
services.
Id. LeFrancois upheld Rhode Island's statute (R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 23-19-13.1 (Supp. 1988)) prohibiting the dumping of out-of-state waste in Rhode Island's
state-operated landfill.
118. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628 n.6.
119. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
120. Id. at 433. See also Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626 (The Philadelphia court found
landfills to be a natural resource.).
121. LeFrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987). See supra note 117
and accompanying text. See also cases from Oregon, Maryland, and the District of Columbia
excluding waste from state- or locally-owned facilities: Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metro-
politan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127, 132 (D. Or. 1986); County Comm'rs v. Stevens, 299
Md. 203, 221-22, 473 A.2d 1221-22 (1984); and Shayne Bros., Inc. v. District of Columbia,
592 F. Supp. 1128, 1134 (D.D.C. 1984).
122. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-19-13.1(a) (Supp. 1988):
(a) No person, firm, or corporation engaged in the business of collecting and disposing of
solid waste shall deposit solid waste that is generated or collected outside the territorial
limits of this state at the central landfill. Each deposit in violation of the provisions of this
subsection shall be punishable by imprisonment for up to three (3) years and/or a fine
not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000.00).
123. LeFrancois, 669 F. Supp. at 1211.
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reserved the benefit of the service to its own residents."" Here the statute
applied only to the sole landfill in the state, which was operated by the
state.
States have formulated a number of schemes to discourage out-of-state
waste importation by making it financially unattractive either for the
would-be importer or the in-state disposal facility owner. There are strict
limitations, however, on the extent to which a state can impose higher taxes
on out-of-state wastes than it does on in-state wastes. 125 Similarly, the
Court struck down a statute providing tax credits to in-state natural gas
consumers but not to out-of-state consumers as violative of the Commerce
Clause. 2 6 However, a coal severance tax that applied to both in and out of
state consumers, but incidentally applied most often to out of state consum-
ers, was upheld in Commonwealth Edison v. Montana.2 " These cases sug-
gest that a state could raise its dumping fee to a very high level to discour-
age out-of-state dumpers, but must impose the same fee on its in-state
users, an unappealing prospect to many states that are anxious to encourage
industry."2
8
Other schemes include Indiana's, 2 9 which assesses out-of-state hazard-
ous waste dumpers at the rate they would have paid in their home state or
124. Owning or operating hazardous waste facilities on a large scale has not appealed to
many states, however, because the siting, maintaining, and monitoring of such facilities under
the increasingly complex federal guidelines are tasks that many states would prefer to pass on
to the private sector. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 67, at 11-4 (Indiana recog-
nizes that the increased sophistication required of siting, operation, and maintenance is better
provided by the private sector); Hadden & Veillette & Brandt, State Roles in Siting Hazard-
ous Waste Disposal Facilities: From State Preemption to Local Veto, THE POLITICS OF HAZ-
ARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT 196, 202-03 (J. Lester & A. Bowman, eds. 1983) [hereinafter
J. Lester & A. Bowman] (The problems of public ownership include passing costs on to the
taxpayer and the political undesirability of the activity; at present seven states permit public
purchase of sites and five permit state operation.). See also Cain, supra note 82, at 792 (citing
financial risk and exposure to liability as undesirable). But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-292
(1986) (Fee simple title to commercial hazardous waste facilities must be conveyed to the
state, which then enters into a long term lease with operators; the operators bear the liability.).
125. The Court will uphold state taxes that burden interstate commerce only if the tax
"I) has a substantial nexus with the State; 2) is fairly apportioned; 3) does not discriminate
against interstate commerce; and 4) is fairly related to the services provided by the State."
Washington Revenue Dept. v. Washington Stevedoring Ass'n, 435 U.S. 734, 750 (1978). In
addition, a state tax cannot survive Commerce Clause analysis if it "discriminates against
interstate commerce . . . by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business." Ma-
ryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 754 (1981).
126. Maryland, 451 U.S. at 760.
127. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
128. Another evenhanded approach would be to tax only the most hazardous substances
at a higher rate to discourage dumping.
129. Indiana's hazardous waste dumping fee is $10.50 per ton. Telephone conversation
with Thomas Russell, Chief of Hazardous Waste Management, Indiana Department of Envi-
ronmental Management (IDEM) (Oct. 14, 1988).
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at Indiana's rate, whichever is higher. This technique is designed to deprive
the would-be exporter of any financial advantage. On the other hand, Geor-
gia has adopted a scheme that requires an in-state facility importing solid
waste to pay $1 into the Solid Waste Trust Fund for every ton of out-of-
state waste received.130 New Jersey assesses treatment, storage, and dispo-
sal (TSD) operators for out-of-district waste on a steadily increasing scale
for an eleven-year period.13' Since the net effect of such legislation in New
Jersey, Georgia, and Indiana is to discourage the flow of waste into these
states, either directly or indirectly, on the basis of the origin of the waste,
these schemes may meet with Commerce Clause challenges.
The Court is also beginning to recognize some possible emergency ex-
ceptions to a strict Commerce Clause application. In 1982, the Court in
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas'32 struck down a state statute requir-
ing a reciprocity agreement between states before water could be ex-
ported. 33 While the reciprocity' s4 element doomed the statute, the Court
did not object to the state's water conservation measure requiring that
would-be exporters seek permission to export after a finding that the with-
drawal of water is reasonable. 135 The Court said that "in the absence of a
contrary view expressed by Congress, we are reluctant to condemn as un-
reasonable, measures taken by a State to conserve and preserve for its own
citizens this vital resource in times of severe shortage.' ' 3 6 The Court went
on to say that such protection of health is a legitimate use of the state's
police power.13 7 Sporhase offers some hope that the Court will look favora-
bly on critical landfill problems in the future. 38 However, many states that
hope to address the problem of waste disposal before a crisis is reached will
find little comfort in the Sporhase decision.
Nearly a dozen years after the Supreme Court decided Philadelphia,
the only effective option for excluding out-of-state hazardous waste may be
the market participant exception,'3 " but local or state ownership of hazard-
130. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-44(c) (1988).
131. N.J. REV. STAT. § 13:1E-138(c) (West Supp. 1988).
132. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
133. Id. at 960.
134. See infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text regarding reciprocity agreements.
135. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 955-56.
136. Id. at 956.
137. Id.
138. In fact, in Borough of Glassboro v. Gloucester County Board of Chosen Freehold-
ers, 100 N.J. 134, 495 A.2d 49 (1985), the court relied on Sporhase in permitting the opera-
tors of a private landfill to ban imports from outside the three-county area (including the
balance of the state of New Jersey). The ban was approved because landfill space was rapidly
dwindling and siting was a critical problem in the area. As an emergency health measure,
therefore, the court permitted such an evenhanded ban until the counties could find alternative
disposal means. Id. at 139, 495 A.2d at 57.
139. See supra notes 116, 117, 123 and 124.
[Vol. 24
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ous waste landfills has not proved to be a popular option.'" Consequently,
environmentally responsible states'14  and industries'4 2 will struggle with re-
cycling and reduction, while facing the reality that their disposal space may
well be usurped by their less judicious neighbors. States that have abundant
landfill space, on the other hand, are relatively unconcerned and look com-
placently about them at the available disposal capacity offered by their
neighbors. For example, while acknowledging that Illinois poses a threat to
its landfill space, Indiana looks to the available capacity in Michigan, Ohio,
and Kentucky. 4 3 At the same time, Indiana has made no legislative moves
to encourage waste minimization, and the hazardous waste dumping fee of
$10.50 per ton' 4 is still attractive to in-state dumpers relative to the na-
tional average of $33.64 per ton or even the Midwest average of $12.71 per
ton."
4 5
In addition to the problems of final disposal, hazardous waste often
moves long distances across the country and presents an ever-increasing
threat of dangerous spills. 146 For example, in 1985 Illinois imported hazard-
ous wastes from thirty-nine states; neighboring states sent Illinois the great-
est amounts, but high amounts were also received from Kansas, Michigan,
North Carolina, Nebraska, New York, and Ohio.' 41 In 1985, Alabama took
in waste from an even broader area with customers sending large amounts
140. See supra note 124.
141. Currently twenty states actively encourage waste minimization, but their programs
are highly variable. Hazardous Waste: Waste Minimization Programs Popular But Imple-
mentation Approach Said Unclear, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 37 (May 13, 1988).
142. E.g., 3M has been profitably engaged in waste reduction since 1975. SERIOUS RE-
DUCTION, supra note 60, at 7.
143. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 67, at 11-12. This complacency is all the
more distressing because Indiana ranks sixteenth nationally in hazardous waste production.
BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 23.
144. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
145. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 67, at 11-13.
146. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERI-
ALS 241 (July 1986). The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act and RCRA Title C are
primary regulations controlling waste transportation; 96% of hazardous wastes are disposed of
on the generation site, but those that are transported are usually moved by truck. Information
regarding road, rail, and water shipments is limited. Id. See also S. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at
32 (some corridors especially risky for hazardous material spills, e.g., the Nashville-Louisville
rail link); INTERAGENCY GROUNDWATER TASK FORCE, PROTECTION OF INDIANA'S GROUND-
WATER 48-49 (1986) (One-half of all water contamination involves spills, and 23% of the
reported spills in 1986 involved transportation accidents.). The National Response Center in
Washington should be notified of all spills. CERCLA § 9603; 49 C.F.R. §§ 171-171.17
(1988).
147. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 1985 Na-
tional Biennial Report of Hazardous Waste Generators and Treatment Storage and Disposal
Facilities 111-15 [DRAFT BIENNIAL REPORT] (Nov. 1988) (a late draft of the final National
Report). See also ILLINOIS E.P.A., SUMMARY OF ANNUAL REPORTS ON HAZARDOUS WASTE
FOR 1983-1985 48-52 (Dec. 1987) (Imports rose very sharply between 1985 and 1986.).
1989]
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from Wisconsin, New Jersey, Colorado, Indiana, Illinois, Minnesota, and
North Carolina. 14
8
The untrammelled movement of hazardous waste around the country is
reaching crisis proportions and does not serve the national interest in a well-
managed environment. ' 9 At least one state official suggests that in certain
parts of the country there may be guerrilla warfare at the state borders
unless some means are offered to control waste movement.' 5° The next sec-
tion explores possible judicial and legislative controls on hazardous waste
movement and disposal.
V. CONTENDING WITH THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. The Judicial Options
While the Philadelphia waste embargo failed under the conventional
Commerce Clause analysis in 1978,"' there is reason to hope that the
Court will begin to recognize the grave environmental consequences of the
decision. The classification of hazardous waste as an article in commerce
may be questioned,' 5 2 and the Court would now have before it abundant
environmental data to show that a state's concerns about the effects of haz-
ardous waste disposal are real.5'5 While it may be unwise, for environmen-
tal policy reasons,' 4 to overturn Philadelphia, this note suggests that states
might be able to restrict the importation of hazardous waste by instituting
148. BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 147, at 111-15.
149. Supra notes 24, 59, 61, 146-48 and accompanying text.
150. Telephone conversation with Jim Frank, Illinois Superfund (Oct. 28, 1988). See
also supra note 27 (South Carolina and North Carolina face off regarding hazardous waste
imports). See generally McKinney, A Panel Discussion on Interstate Conflicts Over Hazard-
ous Waste, 4 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3 (Summer 1989) (a fictitious debate featuring EPA
officials, governors waste handlers, a citizen activist, and a Congressman that introduces the
reader to hottest issues and aptly identifies the flashpoints).
Native American lands and federal lands are not immune from hazardous waste disposal
problems. Indian reservations present interesting problems, as hazardous waste landfills are not
subject to the host state regulations but to the often less stringent EPA standards. There is
much concern that EPA enforcement has been inadequate in many hazardous waste facilities
in the millions of acres of Native American land in the western states. Allen, Who Should
Control Hazardous Waste on Native American Lands? Looking Beyond Washington Depart-
ment of Ecology v. E.P.A., 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69 (1987).
Legislation has been introduced to curb the tendency for western authorities to use grants
of federal land for hazardous waste dumps and then to return the land to the federal govern-
ment, thus avoiding responsibility. 46 CONG. Q. 3163 (Oct. 29, 1988) (On Oct. 21, 1988, the
House cleared a bill preventing reversion of federal lands granted under the Recreation and
Public Purposes Act of 1926.).
151. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 630 (1978).
152. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
153. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
154. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
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evenhanded controls on the nature of the waste they accept.1 55
A frontal attack on the Court's application of the Commerce Clause in
Philadelphia would question whether the case's holding that waste is part
of the stream of commerce comports with the Framers' intent. 56 No de-
tailed legislative history sheds light on the formulation of the Commerce
Clause," 7 but it is clear that the Framers intended to address a defect in
the Articles of Confederation by fostering mutually beneficial trade.'5 8
However, they could not have foreseen the potentially catastrophic national
environmental effects of an uncontrolled trade that permits states to ignore
sound environmental management.'5 9 The quarantine analogy' that Rehn-
quist supports in his Philadelphia dissent may have greater force today in
light of the more complete data about hazardous waste production and the
contamination of the environment that would be available to the Court.' 6'
155. See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
156. Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to
every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his export, and no
foreign states will by customs, duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every con-
sumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in the nation to pro-
tect him from exploitation from any. Such was the vision of the Founders.
H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949). See also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S.
131 (1986) (Commerce Clause does not elevate free trade above all other values); Exxon Corp.
v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (Commerce Clause power stems from the need
for union, not free trade.); L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 404 (detailing the Madisonian interpre-
tation of the Commerce Clause); Smith, State Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce,
74 CALIF. L. REV. 1203, 1207-09 (1986) (Framers' intent was to limit reprisals and provide all
citizens with representation.). Cf. Eule, supra note 97, at 430 (Few words were spent on the
subject of free trade at the Constitutional Convention.).
157. Hamilton's Federalist No. 22 outlines the inspiration behind the Clause:
The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to the true spirit of
the Union have, in different instances, given just cause of umbrage and complaint to
others, and it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if not restrained by a national
control, would be multiplied and extended till they became not less serious sources of
animosity and discord than injurious impediments to the intercourse between the different
parts of the Confederacy.
THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 144-55 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). In fact, it is the free
movement of hazardous waste that is now creating "serious sources of animosity and discord"
among the states.
158. Id. at 143.
159. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
161. A number of legislative acts and events since 1978 have brought the magnitude of
the threat of hazardous waste contamination into public focus. For example, Superfund and
the 1980 and 1984 RCRA regulations have addressed the growing realization that our envi-
ronment is seriously threatened; nationwide hazardous generation and disposal reporting regu-
lations have resulted in the publication of the 1985 BIENNIAL REPORT; the press has high-
lighted a number of particularly distressing instances of neighborhood pollution, including
Love Canal and Times Beach, Missouri. L. GIBBS, LOVE CANAL: MY STORY (1982) (In 1978
Love Canal residents were evacuated when their homes and their health were undermined by
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Even if the Court were to continue to view waste as an article in com-
merce, the "dormant" Commerce Clause 62 analysis may begin to tip in
favor of controls on the movement of hazardous waste. While the Constitu-
tion gives express power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce,1 63 the
Court has long recognized the complementary negative implications for the
states' power to do the same.1" Although the Court's application of this
principle has varied widely, the current Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. balanc-
ing test generally sums up the analysis. 6 ' The dissenters in Philadelphia
recognized the compelling state health and safety purpose 6 behind the law
and dismissed the lack of evenhandedness as an unrealistic requirement. 67
The Court is increasingly inclined to use the balancing test to favor
state interests in Commerce Clause cases involving non-market considera-
tions, especially matters of health, safety, and the environment.'6 8 For ex-
buried hazardous chemical waste.). See generally M. BROWN, LAYING WASTE: THE POISON-
ING OF AMERICA BY Toxic CHEMICALS (1979) (a popular and readable volume detailing the
Love Canal tragedy and similar ecological threats around the country); S. EPSTEIN, supra note
3; TIME, Jan. 2, 1989 (the endangered earth as Planet of the Year).
162. Much ink has been expended on the Commerce Clause over the years. Many com-
mentators remark on its vacillations and some would restrict its scope as a limit on state
power. See Eule, supra note 97 (Eule favors a diminished role of the dormant Commerce
Clause and the Court as its interpreter; he sees the only role of the dormant Commerce Clause
as protecting representational government and feels that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
would do as well.). See also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 418-20 (1946).
The Commerce Clause "is not the simple clean-cutting tool supposed .... [Ilts implied nega-
tive operation on state power has been uneven, at times highly variable. . . . [T]he history of
the Commerce Clause has been one of very considerable judicial oscillation." Id.; Farber,
State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY, 395 (1986)
(would reduce the role of the judiciary in settling disputes and leave it to the agencies, which
are better equipped for the job); Redish, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitu-
tional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569 (1987) (Redish sees no textual foundation
for the dormant Commerce Clause and would eliminate the dormant Commerce Clause analy-
sis in order that Congressional inertia would favor state power rather than work against state
power as it now does; he would favor Congress only overturning state regulations that are
grossly protectionist.); Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986) (would restrict the reach of
the Commerce Clause to laws that have a protectionist purpose rather than merely a protec-
tionist effect and those that benefit locals at the expense of foreign competitors); Smith, supra
note 156, at 1203 (finds the judicial handling of Commerce Clause matters "irretrievably
muddled" and notes that between 1941 and 1986 there were only ten regulations invalidated
on Commerce Clause grounds, while between 1976 and 1986, there were also ten).
163. See supra note 9.
164. See supra note 162.
165. See supra note 94.
166. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978). See also Maine
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (States have authority under their police powers to regu-
late matters of local concern even if there is an effect on interstate commerce.).
167. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 630.
168. R. FINDLEY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 216 (1988) (balancing tests in
Commerce Clause cases often favor environmental concerns). See also Stewart, supra note 66,
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ample, the Court upheld the first "bottle law" in Oregon,""9 finding persua-
sive the state's argument that such a law would substantially reduce litter
and conserve energy.1 70 The Court found the law to be a non-discriminatory
use of police powers, which did not excessively burden the flow of interstate
commerce.
17
Only three years after Philadelphia, the Court considered Minnesota's
ban on the use of plastic milk containers,"7 2 a measure to preserve landfill
space and to protect the environment from the proliferation of non-bi-
odegradable materials. 73 The Minnesota Supreme Court had rejected the
law on Equal Protection grounds7 4 as the law favored the local paper in-
dustry over the largely out-of-state plastic industry. The U.S. Supreme
Court disagreed, upholding the law against both Equal Protection and
Commerce Clause challenges. 75 The Court saw the ban as non-discrimina-
tory and fulfilling evenhandedly, and in the least restrictive manner, a com-
pelling state environmental purpose.176
In reviewing a similar waste ban, the Court would be unlikely to find a
purely economic protectionist motive, especially if the state showed itself to
be actively engaged in sound waste management practices. Any such law,
however, would still run aground on the evenhandedness portion of the Pike
at 264:
Non-market values have become more precious as a result of industrial development and
commercial homogenization. It is hardly surprising that the judicial techniques developed
to maintain an open market economy cannot carry over to environmental and natural
resource controversies where the market often fails to allocate resources equitably or
wisely.
Id. See generally Regan, supra note 162 (citing the Court's recent tendency to favor protec-
tionism in natural resources cases) and Levy & Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in
the Supreme Court's Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343 (1989) (contend-
ing that the Court is less protective of the environment than Congress intended).
169. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 459.810-459.890 (1985) (requiring beverage retailers and dis-
tributors to accept empty containers and pay a refund).
170. Note, The Oregon Bottle Bill, 54 OR. L. REV. 175, 190-91 (1975) (paraphrasing
American Can v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1974)).
171. American Can, 15 Or. App. at 630, 517 P.2d at 702. But see Note, State Environ-
mental Protection Legislation and the Commerce Clause, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1762, 1768
(1974) (criticizes the Oregon Supreme Court for a rather facile Commerce Clause analysis).
172. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
173. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116F.21 (West Supp. 1980) (repealed by Laws of Minn. 1981
ch. 151, § 2, eff. May 9, 1981).
174. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 289 N.W.2d 79 (1979).
175. Minnesota, 449 U.S. at 456. See Stewart, supra note 66, at 251 (noting that the
Court in Clover Leaf did not use a rigorous undue burden analysis because of technical com-
plexity, the non-market values at stake, and the regional nature of the conflict).
176. Minnesota, 449 U.S. at 471-73. See also Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453
U.S. 609 (1981) (deference given to matters regarding natural resources); Huron Portland
Cement v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 448 (1960) (local smoke abatement code not an
undue burden on interstate commerce and is a valid exercise of police powers).
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test, 1 7 unless the state could show that the environmental problems engen-
dered by the disposal were already of crisis proportions.1 7 1 In any case, the
implications of permitting all states to effect such unilateral bans would
work to the severe disadvantage of those states that simply cannot manage
the enormous volume of their own hazardous waste because of geological
constraints.1 79
In the interests of furthering the national policy objective of waste
minimization, one option for the individual states would be to institute and
enforce strict recycling and waste reduction legislation 8 ' and then to ban
the disposal of any wastes that do not meet standards at least as stringent
as those in effect in the importing state."a The Court would no doubt find
this measure to be evenhanded as it would apply to in-state and out-of-state
dumpers1 8 2 and that it would be the least discriminatory manner in which
to limit pollution short of banning disposal of all hazardous wastes. Finally,
the Court would find that the local benefits in terms of minimizing the vol-
ume and toxicity of disposed wastes outweighed the burden to shippers and
out-of-state generators.
Under current Commerce Clause analysis, a state cannot require recip-
rocal agreements8 a in instituting hazardous waste measures. Nor can it re-
quire that the exporting state enact similar laws,' 84 but it may be able to
177. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. See also Campbell, State Ownership
of Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites: A Technique for Excluding Out-of-State Wastes?, 14
ENVTL. L. 177 (1983) (warning of problems resulting from closed state borders).
180. Of course, this scheme could lead to a bewilderment of minimization standards,
and the need for national uniformity may then become compelling. However, until national
standards are established, states should be able to protect themselves.
A potential problem that goes beyond the scope of this note is the extent to which states
could institute minimization standards for wastes not currently generated in their own states.
Such broad legislation might be seen as aimed exclusively at barring out-of-state wastes, al-
though its environmental soundness would be unquestioned. But see Exxon v. Maryland, 437
U.S. 117, 125 (1977) (Maryland statute preventing gas supply preferences upheld even though
the burden fell solely on interstate companies because Maryland had no local producers or
refiners).
181. See Recycling, supra note 125, at 1342-44 (advocating a similar scheme in the
solid waste context).
182. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
183. A reciprocity agreement requires that the foreign state promise to provide a service
or enact a law to accommodate the regulating state. The failure to do so results in a closing of
the state border. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 954-58 (1982) (no
reciprocity requirement in interstate groundwater transfers); Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 375-78 (1976) (a quid pro quo requirement for interstate milk sales is
a reciprocity that violates the Commerce Clause); Hardage v. Atkins, 582 F.2d 1264 (10th
Cir. 1978) (reciprocity agreement requirement for import of industrial waste struck down).
184. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988) (striking down an
Ohio law giving a tax credit for sale of ethanol either produced in Ohio or, if produced in
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put the burden of compliance on all generators, in-state as well as out-of-
state. Such a scheme would reward responsible states and generators for
instituting the kind of sound hazardous waste management and minimiza-
tion practices that are called for repeatedly in federal legislation.
While the judicial options to excluding undesirable hazardous wastes
are still very limited under the traditional Commerce Clause analysis, 85
Congress has very broad powers regarding matters of interstate commerce.
Congress can and should exercise these powers""8 to regulate the interstate
flow of hazardous wastes.
B. Legislative Options
Congressional power to legislate in matters touching on interstate com-
merce is plenary. 187 Indeed, Congress has a long history of legislating in
order to prevent the perpetuation of harmful activities or commodities in
interstate commerce.' 88 Over the years state borders have been closed to
lottery tickets, 89 obscene materials, 9 ' white slave traffic,' 9' stolen vehi-
cles, 9 ' kidnapped persons,'9 3 flight to avoid prosecution,' 94 and adulterated
food.' 95 In addition, Congress has the power to approve interstate hazard-
ous waste disposal compacts that exclude waste importation.
Congress has used its Commerce Clause power to preempt the field'98
in some environmental areas, including the Hazardous Materials Transpor-
another state, when that state gives reciprocal tax advantages to Ohio ethanol); Hardage v.
Atkins, 619 F.2d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1980) (Hardage, 582 F.2d 1264 on remand) (States may
not require substantially similar legislation in the exporting state with the alternative that
waste imports are barred.).
185. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
188. Stewart, supra note 9, at 1230:
Congressional authority to use the commerce power in the service of moral ideas is long-
established. It may only be in the context of a nationwide commitment that individuals or
communities will be persuaded mutually to forego consumption in order to fulfill duties to
the weak and vulnerable or preserve the inheritance of future generations. The most seri-
ous vice of a liberal society is the comfortable complacency that serves as veneer for
narrow self-interest. Nationally determined policies may be indispensable engines of
moral change.
Id.
189. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
190. United States v. Popper, 98 F. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1899).
191. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
192. Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
193. Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936).
194. Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1947).
195. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
196. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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tation Act,197 and it certainly could occupy the entire field of hazardous
waste management to the exclusion of competing state legislation.19 8 Con-
gress will likely continue to erode state authority by promulgating mini-
mum standards, recognizing that the federal government does not have the
resources for such an onerous task. While a vastly increased federal com-
mitment to developing waste minimization technologies has been called
for,1 99 the federal government is still no closer to instituting baseline mini-
mization standards to complement the extensive legislation in the area of
hazardous waste management. 00
Because of the manifest severity of the hazardous waste production
and disposal crisis in this country,201 at least minimal Congressional inter-
vention into the interstate aspects of the problem is warranted. Proposals
involving interstate compacts2 02 and the hazardous waste exclusion/minimi-
zation legislation 20 3 would require a minimum of federal intervention into
state authority. Such proposals would also encourage states to effect the
kinds of hazardous waste controls at the production end that federal legisla-
tion has recommended. 20 4
The Congressionally-approved state compact system, permitting states
to enter agreements to address common problems and share resources, was
envisioned by the Constitution29 and is mentioned in RCRA20 6 as a viable
197. Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1811 (1982) (state or local
requirements regarding hazardous materials transportation preempted). See also Schuknecht,
Overcast & Dively, Federal Preemption of State and Local Radioactive Materials Transpor-
tation Regulations IV TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 3 (1985) (discussing HMTA with regard
to radioactive wastes).
198. See Comment, Preemption Doctrine in the Environmental Context: A Unified
Method of Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 197 (1978). It is interesting to note that in
reauthorizing both RCRA in 1984 and CERCLA in 1986, Congress has shown itself to have
lost confidence in the EPA's discretionary functions, and Congress itself has become the regu-
lator. But Congress is reluctant to make such moves unless some event "such as an environ-
mental disaster, an upsurge in public concern ... moves the issue to the top of the legislative
agenda." Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous Waste Policy in the 1980s, 3
YALE J. ON REG. 351, 376 (1986). But see Rotunda, Sheathing the Sword of Federal Preemp-
tion, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 311 (1988) (detailing Reagan's 1987 Executive Order limiting
preemption).
199. FROM POLLUTION, supra note 6, at 36-38.
200. Id. See supra note 46.
201. See, e.g., supra note 161.
202. See infra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
205. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress
. . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State. ... Compacts are the join-
ing together of two or more states to share resources and effect joint planning schemes, espe-
cially with regard to environmental and natural resource issues. See also Frankfurter & Lan-
dis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE
L.J. 685, 708 (1925) (advocating compacts as regional solutions to regional problems).
[Vol. 24
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 [2011], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol24/iss1/4
1989] HAZARDOUS WASTE
waste management option.2 °7 Compacts are not often formed, but in the
1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act,208 Congress called on the states to band
together and form compacts to pool low-level radioactive waste facilities;
nine such compacts have been approved to date.20 9 The advantages are
great: Compacts provide an opportunity to pool state resources, to limit
cross-country movement of waste, and to exclude out-of-compact waste. 10
Some public opposition has arisen in two host states, but this has not proved
to be a significant obstacle. 11
Now that states have joined forces to address a common waste disposal
problem, the time is ripe to further encourage this practice. The reporting
and planning requirements of the Capacity Assurance Program 212 would
206. RCRA § 6904. Some cooperative efforts have been made to help with regional
siting of facilities (New England Regional Commission and Delaware River Basin Commis-
sion), but they lack the statutory authority of a compact. GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra
note 61, at 175-234.
207. At least one commentator is convinced that compacts are impracticable: "Ideally,
regional solutions would be preferable and have indeed been called for by academies. However,
given the failure of past attempts in both water and air pollution . . . it would appear to be
fruitless to spend much time pursuing this chimera."
Lieber, Federalism and Hazardous Waste Policy, in J. Lester & A. Bowman, supra note 124,
at 68-69.
208. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat.
3347, superseded by Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021(b)-(j) (Supp. IV 1986).
States have made unsuccessful attempts, prior to this Act, to exclude their neighbors' radioac-
tive wastes. See Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 518 F. Supp.
928 (E.D. Wash. 1981), aff'd 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982). But see Mostaghel, Who Regu-
lates the Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act?, 9 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 73 (1988) (criticizing the Commerce Clause application
in Spellman and recommending that go-it-alone states be allowed to exclude waste).
209. Telephone interview with Gregg Larson, Executive Director, Midwest Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Commission, (Jan. 4, 1989). Eight states have decided not to join
compacts.
210. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 (LLRWPA), 42 U.S.C. §
2021(c). But note that states acting alone may not be able to exclude outside waste from their
facility. Berkowitz, Waste Wars: Did Congress "Nuke" State Sovereignty in the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985?, 11 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 437 (1987);
M. SEITZINGER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LEGAL ANALYSIS OF WHETHER A
STATE CAN EXCLUDE Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE GENERATED OUTSIDE THE STATE
FROM DISPOSAL WITHIN THE STATE (1986).
211. Both Nebraska and Michigan, which have been designated as host states for radio-
active waste disposal within their compacts, have met with local opposition. Some citizens
found undesirable the prospect of becoming the sole repository for all the wastes generated in
the compact. Nebraska voters defeated an initiative in the November 1988 election advocating
that the state withdraw from the compact. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 20, 1988, § A, at 18.
212. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Of course, this ban would only apply to
wastes entering the state for the purpose of disposal, rather than for processing or recycling.
The federal government has acknowledged the wisdom of states bonding together:
The EPA originally interpreted this authority [§ 104(c)(9)] to permit only contracts or
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lay an effective foundation for states to assess reliably their long-range mu-
tual needs and resources, and would require states to come to the bargain-
ing table repeatedly to formulate interstate hazardous waste agreements. 21 3
Congress should take this opportunity to provide additional incentives to the
states to form hazardous waste compacts. In fact, some states that have
already formed low-level radioactive waste compacts may be inclined to
consider a similar hazardous waste option.214 Incentives should include gen-
erous federal grants to aid a would-be compact with planning strategies,
with waste minimization studies of industries within the compact, and with
the siting, construction, and maintenance of disposal and processing facili-
ties. Most important, however, the federal government must be prepared to
permit the compact states to exclude hazardous waste from non-compact
states as it has done with the low-level radioactive waste compacts.215
In return for such incentives, Congress should require, as preconditions
to compact approval, that the compact states demonstrate the following:
1. that they have produced acceptable twenty-year capacity plans involv-
ing agreements among the compact states only; 16
2. that they have instituted uniform waste minimization guidelines and
strict enforcement procedures for their hazardous waste producing
industries;
3. that they have agreed to construct and maintain jointly-funded facili-
ties, if necessary, especially those that process or recycle wastes, and have
enacted similar enabling legislation for facility siting;
4. that they have undertaken the responsibility to dispose of their own
hazardous wastes, although the compact states may agree to exchange
wastes among themselves; 1 7
cooperative agreements on a site-by-site basis. However, the Agency has subsequently
recognized the advantages to both the Federal Government and the States of permitting
'multi-site' cooperative agreements, ...
One substantial advantage of multi-state cooperative agreements is that they will
better enable EPA and the States to more effectively and efficiently use and target their
limited resources.
S. Rep. No. I1, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 24-25 (1985).
213. Under the proposed guidelines for the capacity assurance the states would enter
into agreements to exchange waste and would update the agreements every two years. ASSUR-
ANCE, supra note 62, at 9.
214. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. A multi-state compact arrangement
covering all hazardous wastes may not be a viable one for certain portions of the country such
as EPA Regions 11, IV, and VI [the Eastern seaboard and the South], which produced 80.7%
of the hazardous waste produced in 1985. BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 5.
215. LLRWPA, § 2021(c). How far Congress can go in shaping compacts is uncertain.
See Heron, The Interstate Compact in Transition: From Cooperative State Action to Congres-
sionally Coerced Agreements, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1985) (criticizing congressional coer-
cion in the formation of the Northwest Power Council).
216. See SARA § 104(c)(9), supra note 58 and accompanying text.
217. This provision parallels the SARA § 104(c)(9) provision but limits the number of
[Vol. 24
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5. that they have agreed to serve as emergency disposal backup for a rea-
sonable amount of waste from the other compact states;
6. that they have formed an effective governing body to referee disputes
with federal assistance;218 and
7. that they have instituted dumping fee controls that will assure compact
industries that they will not be at the mercy of compact facilities.
In addition to such incentives for compact formation, Congress should
encourage non-compact states to formulate their own minimization man-
dates for specific hazardous wastes because the federal government is not
prepared to do so. For those states that do not wish to take advantage of the
compact system, but who have taken steps to reduce hazardous wastes,
Congress should enable them to apply the same rigorous in-state standards
to waste that is imported. If Congress were to expressly empower states to
enforce across-the-board minimization standards, the Commerce Clause
challenges would be foreclosed219 and states would be able to limit their
disposal facilities to hazardous waste generators that have dealt with their
waste responsibly.
VI. CONCLUSION
Hazardous waste disposal is one of the most compelling environmental
crises facing this country. Both federal legislative and judicial action and
inaction, however, have foreclosed a workable, unified national attack. The
federal government has proved unable to take the lead in waste minimiza-
tion, and the Commerce Clause doctrine requires that hazardous wastes
move freely among the states as articles of commerce. While the federal
regulatory controls tighten with the promulgation of each new act, federal
law does not preempt the entire field. Congress has not been an effective
leader in requiring strict waste minimization, the only effective long-term
technique to alleviate the problem. Rather, the states are left to their own
devices and are often content to export wastes rather than take responsibil-
ity for both the generation and the disposal of their own hazardous wastes.
Options for limiting this flow are very limited.
CERCLA § 104(c)(9), the Capacity Assurance Program, is a starting
point in encouraging states to improve their performance with regard to
states that can dispose of each other's waste.
218. Clearly, the federal government would be reluctant to take part in such disputes if
the capacity assurance guidelines are a fair indication. See supra note 62. Cf. Act of January
15, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-240, January 15, 1986, 99 Stat. 189 - 99ff. Article III sets up the
Midwest States Compact Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission.
219. As Congress would have exercised its plenary power to grant the states the right to
enforce such legislation affecting interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause analysis would
be irrelevant. See supra note 9.
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facility siting and to studying and accounting for the movement of their
wastes. This program will force states to assess their own legislation and to
forge disposal agreements with other states. But this provision alone is in-
sufficient to address the problem.
The Commerce Clause analysis that the Court currently employs sug-
gests that some justices are giving more weight to state environmental con-
cerns. However, a Court review of a state hazardous waste import ban
would almost certainly not survive constitutional scrutiny after Philadel-
phia unless the state environmental problem had already reached crisis pro-
portions. In recognition of the hazardous waste contamination crisis that
has been reached in this country, Congress must be willing to exercise its
Commerce Clause authority. Federal environmental legislation has long en-
couraged interstate and regional cooperation as well as compacts, and Con-
gress has the power to put strong incentives in place to encourage such
formation. In addition, environmentally responsible non-compact states
should have the option of excluding hazardous waste imports that do not
conform to the strict minimization standards mandated by the importing
state.
Natural resources in the United States are not without limit, and the
burden of our stewardship is a heavy one. One hundred and thirty-six years
after Chief Seattle wrote to President Pierce, his words may have proved
prophetic:
Your destiny is a mystery to us. What will happen when the
buffalo are all slaughtered? The wilderness tamed? What will
happen when the secret corners of the forest are heavy with the
scent of many men and the view of the ripe hills is blotted by
talking wires? Where will the thicket be?... The end of living
and the beginning of survival.2
SUSAN ADAMS BRIETZKE
220. J. CAMPBELL & B. MOYERS, supra note 1. Similarly prophetic are Hardin's famous
words: "Ruin is the destination toward which all men run, each pursuing his own best interest
in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to
all." Hardin, The Tragedy of The Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
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